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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this paper is to develop a comprehensive research agenda to analyze trends in domestic 
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on job quality and inequality. In the process, we review definitions of outsourcing, the available scant 
empirical research, and limitations of existing data sources. We also summarize theories that attempt to 
explain why firms contract out for certain functions and assess their predictions about likely impacts on 
job quality. We then lay out in detail a major research initiative on domestic outsourcing, discussing the 
questions it should answer and providing a menu of research methodologies and potential data sources. 
Such a research investment will be a critical resource for policymakers and other stakeholders as they 
seek solutions to problems arising from the changing nature of work. 
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Stagnant wages, growing inequality, and the deterioration of job quality are among the 
most important challenges facing the U.S. economy today. Although domestic outsourcing—
firms’ use of contractors, franchises, and independent contractors—is a potentially important 
mechanism through which companies reduce compensation and shift economic risk to workers, 
surprisingly little is known about the extent of this practice and its implications for wages and 
working conditions. Our review of the available research suggests that domestic outsourcing 
takes place on a much larger scale and affects many more workers than has been recognized—
ranging from low-wage service workers such as janitors, security guards, warehouse workers, 
and hotel housekeepers to professional and technical workers such as programmers, health care 
technicians, and accountants. These trends are part of a structural change in the organization of 
production and work across firms that we suspect is profoundly affecting the quality of jobs and 
the nature of the employment contract for a significant portion of the American workforce (Weil 
2014).  
The goal of this paper is to develop a comprehensive research agenda to analyze trends in 
domestic outsourcing in the United States and its effects on the quality of jobs—including 
wages, benefits, employee skills and discretion at work, training and mobility opportunities, and 
job security—as well as inequality across jobs. In the process, we review definitions of 
outsourcing, the available scant empirical research, and limitations of existing data sources. We 
also summarize theories that attempt to explain why firms contract out for certain functions and 
assess their predictions about likely impacts on job quality. We then lay out in detail a major 
research initiative on domestic outsourcing, discussing the questions it should answer and 
providing a menu of research methodologies and potential data sources.  
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In our view, such a research investment will be a critical resource for policymakers and 
other stakeholders as they seek solutions to problems arising from the changing nature of work. 
Domestic outsourcing has potentially important implications for the adequacy of existing 
employment and labor laws; the provision of health, pension, and other workplace benefits; and 
workplace enforcement strategies—all topics of current debates that could be informed by better 
data and research.  
THE PROBLEM 
Firms’ choices regarding the organization of work and production play a critical role in 
shaping the skill requirements of jobs, the level and distribution of wages, and working 
conditions. This is well-documented in the sociological research on job quality (Kalleberg 2013), 
the industrial relations literature (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986), and the management 
literature (Cappelli 1999). In particular, industry-based empirical research has documented how 
variation in employer strategies between firms in the same industry has led to variation in the 
quality of jobs (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003; Gautie and Schmitt 2010). That 
research typically focused on comparing work restructuring within the establishments of primary 
firms and showed how managerial choices to pursue value-added or cost-focused strategies often 
lead to differences in the quality of jobs for workers in the same occupation or with the same 
skill level.  
We believe that the next step for understanding how firm strategies affect the quality of 
jobs and inequality is to study more systematically the reallocation of labor across organizations, 
as a result of firms contracting with other firms (or independent contractors) for goods and 
services. We refer to this process as domestic outsourcing or contracting out. Based on existing 
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research and imperfect datasets, we suspect that firms have increased their use of outsourcing 
and that the effects of the reallocation of jobs across firms are at least as salient as the 
reorganization of work within firms that has been more typically studied (Weil 2014). If we are 
correct, then this raises the possibility that the rise of domestic outsourcing may have contributed 
to growing wage inequality, which would help to explain recent research findings that the 
majority of the increase in inequality has occurred between firms (Barth et al. 2014; Handwerker 
and Spletzer 2015).1 We also suspect that variation in firms’ contracting decisions leads to quite 
different labor market outcomes, depending on such factors as ownership structures and market 
pressures, industry and occupation, motivation for contracting, and power relations between the 
primary firm and different tiers of contractors. For example, outsourcing overflow work in high 
or uncertain demand conditions or to take advantage of specialized expertise or technology may 
have different implications for worker outcomes than outsourcing of functions previously 
performed in-house in order to reduce labor costs.  
Contracting out is difficult to define because, in the broadest sense, a large part of 
economic activity has always occurred through business-to-business transactions, as captured in 
macro-economic input-output models. Our observation, however, is that the scale and scope of 
contracting for goods and services production has changed in fundamental ways in recent 
decades, and that this change—and its implications for the quality of jobs—needs to be 
conceptualized more clearly and examined empirically. In the past, much of value creation 
occurred within large enterprises; in recent decades, however, the vertical disintegration of large 
corporations has led to more value creation through decentralized production networks, resulting 
in a larger proportion of productive activity occurring through business-to-business contracting.  
                                                 
1 Indeed, Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) show that the outsourcing of cleaning, food, security, and 
logistics services accounts for a sizable share of the growth in wage inequality in Germany since the 1980s.  
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While this transformation has been the focus of considerable research in its international 
form (the offshoring of work in global supply chains), until recently the domestic counterpart has 
received relatively little scholarly attention. This, despite some evidence suggesting that the 
growth in offshore outsourcing has been accompanied by growth in domestic outsourcing 
(Yuskavage, Strassner, and Medeiros 2008) and the fact that the majority of production in supply 
chains is still domestic or regional (Rugman, Li, and Oh 2009).  
Specifically, we lack research on three fronts: the prevalence and different patterns of 
firm-level contracting within and across industries; the factors driving contracting out; and the 
relationship between these patterns and the quality of jobs at the workplace. First, inadequate and 
incomplete data mean that it is difficult to estimate the prevalence of domestic outsourcing of 
various business functions across sectors of the economy or the number of workers affected by it, 
though estimates are feasible for several specific industries and occupations (Dey, Houseman, 
and Polivka 2010). Similarly, our understanding of variation in contracting strategies within and 
across industries is thin, but initial research suggests that the stylized view of domestic 
outsourcing as a linear supply chain or a unidirectional process of economic fragmentation is 
inadequate (Gospel and Sako 2010). 
Second, we lack a clear understanding of the factors that are driving domestic 
outsourcing—and by extension, whether firm decisions about what to retain in-house and what to 
outsource have changed over time. At a general level, market deregulation, heightened 
competition, technological change, and the rising influence of institutional investors and 
shareholders have put severe pressure on U.S. firms to reduce costs and headcount and increase 
quality and responsiveness to consumer demand. Some evidence suggests that firms have 
responded by focusing on their “core competencies” and outsourcing peripheral or low value-
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added tasks as well as higher value-added specialized functions. Advanced technologies have 
facilitated this process by allowing firms to outsource entire functions and more easily monitor 
contractors as well as employees who work virtually, leading to new forms of networked 
production and the rise of specialized firms. But few studies provide a more fine-grained 
empirical analysis of which factors are more salient for different industries or how these 
differences lead to distinct forms of outsourcing and contracting relationships—and in turn, 
differential outcomes for workers.  
Third and most important, we lack robust research on how domestic outsourcing and the 
nature of the relationship between contracting firms affects wages and other dimensions of job 
quality, such as benefits, hours, workload, job stability, schedule stability, occupational safety 
and health, incidence of wage theft, and access to training and promotions. As we will see, some 
of the theoretical frameworks in this area predict that job quality and mobility opportunities will 
suffer when jobs that do not require a college degree are contracted out. Predictions are less clear 
for other cases—for example, jobs requiring professional, technical, or specialized skills, or 
those that are outsourced to large and diversified contractors. The impacts of the rise of on-
demand platforms—such as Uber, TaskRabbit, and Upwork—are especially difficult to study 
because the work constitutes a collection of micro jobs (“gigs”) that often supplement 
individuals’ income from a main job; as a result, government surveys of workers are likely to 
miss some portion of this work activity.   
In sum, our review of existing research suggests a substantial lack of knowledge about 
domestic outsourcing in the United States—its prevalence and the various forms it takes, its 
causes, and its effects on job quality and inequality.  
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DEFINING DOMESTIC OUTSOURCING 
In producing goods and services for final demand, firms may choose to perform certain 
functions in-house or they may contract with other firms for those inputs. For example, 
companies may perform manufacturing, transportation, research and development, IT services, 
accounting, or cleaning functions in-house, or they may outsource those functions by contracting 
with another firm. Changes in the mix of this “make or buy” decision over time have been 
variously labeled the vertical disintegration of the firm, the changing boundary of the firm, the 
growth of networked production, and so forth. We review different academic approaches to this 
question in the next section. 
Specifically, we define domestic outsourcing as firms or governmental entities located in 
the United States contracting with other firms or individuals located in the United States for the 
provision of goods and services. In this definition, we include the outsourcing of functions that 
used to be performed in-house, new activities that have emerged as contract services from the 
start, and activities that have always been outsourced but where the scale or nature of the 
outsourcing has changed. Types of contractors include suppliers or vendors of goods (such as 
manufacturing inputs) or services (such as business services or staffing firms), franchisees, and 
independent contractors (such as freelancers, independent consultants, or on-demand platform 
workers).2  
In order to capture important changes in the organization of work across firms and its 
implications for workers, our definition of domestic outsourcing is broad in scope. Given that 
research on this topic is at an early stage, we think it is prudent to take an empirical approach to 
identifying the range of forms that outsourcing may take, rather than eliminating certain 
                                                 
2 We only include true independent contractors in this definition, though in practice, misclassification may 
be one of the strategies that accompany contracting out. 
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categories from the start. This will help ensure that we capture the full extent of change in the 
organization of production and its impact on workers. We do not, for example, limit the 
definition of domestic outsourcing to purchased services, as in Yuskavage, Strassner, and 
Medeiros (2008).3 Note that while we include purchases of both goods and services in our 
definition, not all contracting for materials and services inputs are of interest. For example, firms 
have always purchased office supplies, and absent any indication that the scope or nature of 
contracting for these products has significantly changed, the contracting for office supplies 
would not be a good candidate for study. In contrast, there has been significant restructuring of 
domestic manufacturing supply chains with greater reliance on suppliers and subcontractors, and 
the changing relations of power between primary and contractor firms have important 
implications for the quality of jobs and inequality. In practice, researchers may choose to focus 
their analysis on a particular industry; certain types of outsourced functions, such as business 
support services; or one form of contracting, such as franchising.  
Figure 1 distinguishes between several levels of analysis that research on domestic 
outsourcing should examine. A first distinction is between changes at the firm level, in the 
organization of production, and changes at the job or workplace level, in the organization of 
work (Grimshaw, Willmott, and Rubery 2005). Ultimately, we are interested in the effects of 
domestic outsourcing on job quality and workers, but this first distinction requires understanding 
changes in the organization of production at the firm level. Outsourcing is an action by a firm 
and should be defined and measured at that level; this is the first level of analysis. The empirical 
question then becomes, what is the impact of firm-level outsourcing decisions on the 
organization of work at the establishment level and, by extension, the quality of jobs. This is the 
                                                 
3 For other examples of related definitions, see Berlingieri (2014); Brown, Sturgeon, and Lane (2014); and 
Weil (2014). 
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second level of analysis. In addition, the potential growth of on-demand gig work as well as 
other forms of job fragmentation suggest a third level of analysis: worker outcomes across jobs. 
Here, the question is how workers are bundling multiple forms of income-generating work to 
achieve economic security, and how they are building careers across jobs and over time.  
Relationship between Domestic Outsourcing and Nonstandard Work 
An important feature of our framework is that it clarifies the relationship between 
domestic outsourcing and contingent or nonstandard work. Although there is no consensus on 
what constitutes “nonstandard” employment, to illustrate how it differs from work that has been 
outsourced, we use the categories identified in the BLS CPS Supplement on Contingent and 
Alternative Work Arrangements: direct-hire temporaries, agency temporaries, on-call workers, 
day laborers, contract workers performing work at the client’s worksite, and independent 
contractors. By contrast, standard jobs follow the structure of the traditional employment 
relationship in the United States: workers are employees of the firm, and while employment in 
the United States is “at-will,” there is an implicit contract of permanent employment.  
As shown in Figure 2, jobs at contractor firms may be standard or nonstandard; the same 
is true for in-house jobs. This point is critical: Contractor firms may be small fly-by-night shops 
offering spot employment or large multinational corporations—such as Aramark or Securitas—
offering standard employment contracts. As a result, there is nothing inherently contingent or 
nonstandard about jobs at contractor firms, and outsourcing’s impact on the organization of work 
and job quality is not predetermined. We suspect that in some industries, nonstandard jobs may 
be more prevalent at contractor firms, as is the case in call centers (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 
2009), but establishing this relationship (and understanding its determinants) is an empirical 
question. Similarly, how other job quality outcomes (such as wages, benefits, hours, schedules, 
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and workplace safety) map onto each of the employment relationships in the table is an empirical 
question.  
Examples of Domestic Outsourcing 
Firms in every sector of the economy contract with other firms as part of their production 
process, as do governmental entities. The functions that are outsourced vary widely, and even a 
cursory sampling shows considerable diversity: human resources and R&D functions, building 
services, recycling, regulation and compliance, accounting, credit card collections, call centers, 
mortgage and check processing, information technology and data processing, logistics and 
transportation, machine maintenance, cable installation, food services and food processing, parts 
manufacturing and assembly, laundry, housekeeping, diagnostic labs and MRI scans, and clinical 
research trials.  
The structure of firm-level contracting relationships is similarly varied. Based on the 
existing research literature, we have identified several different examples, depicted in the figures 
below. The figures illustrate the variety and complexity of contracting structures and are meant 
to be suggestive, not exhaustive. Moreover, existing research does not document the prevalence 
of any of these forms; that is an empirical question for future research. 
The archetypal image of firm-to-firm contracting is the linear supply chain. For example, 
in Figure 3a, we illustrate the food supply chain in the United States, showing the classic line of 
contracting from agriculture all the way through to firms that sell food to consumers (which may 
be contractors themselves, as in the case of food services companies). But domestic contracting 
also includes a wide array of business-to-business transactions that are not well captured by the 
supply chain paradigm. In Figure 3b, we illustrate what Barenberg (2015) calls the “hub and 
spoke” model of contracting, where the lead firm (in this case a building owner) contracts with a 
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number of other firms for on-site services such as cleaning and security and off-site services such 
as insurance. Note that one could flip this diagram and place a major business services contract 
firm (such as Compass) at the hub and identify its contracts with a wide range of clients via the 
spokes. Figure 3c illustrates a nonhierarchical production network, featuring continuous 
collaboration between video game publishers, console manufacturers, and software developers 
and designers (Balland, De Vaan, and Boschma 2013). Figure 3d shows the classic pyramidal 
franchising structure that is prevalent in fast food and other industries (Weil 2014).  
Finally, in Figure 4 we use the hotel industry to illustrate how several different 
contracting structures operate together to deliver a set of final services to the consumer (adapted 
from Barenberg [2015, Figure 7]; see also Weil [2014]). The figure shows the franchising 
structure of a hotel brand, the services contracting of a particular hotel, the logistics contracting 
chain for delivering furniture and linens, and the use of independent contractors in the case of 
trucking and temp staffing firms in the case of warehouses. Note that this diagram could be 
expanded to include many more nodes of contracting, such as the use of staffing firms by the 
manufacturers or the contracting by the security services company with other clients besides the 
hotel franchise. 
These descriptive diagrams raise a host of important questions, both about the contracting 
relationships themselves and about their impact on workers. How prevalent is domestic 
contracting and how has it changed over time? What factors are driving it and how does it vary 
by industry, occupation, firm-level strategies, and other organizational characteristics? And how 
do these different models of contracting out affect the organization of work within and across 
firm boundaries and, by extension, the quality of jobs, inequality, and other labor market 
outcomes? 
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In the next three sections, we review existing theories and empirical research to identify 
what is known about the causes and consequences of outsourcing on labor market outcomes. In 
the final section, we propose a major research initiative designed to significantly strengthen the 
body of knowledge about this important but understudied economic trend.  
WHY DO FIRMS CONTRACT OUT, AND WHAT EXPLAINS VARIATION IN  
THEIR STRATEGIES? 
Central to theories of the firm is why, or under what conditions, they choose to make 
versus buy goods and services. Social science research explained the vertical integration of firms 
over most of the twentieth century by arguing that internal production was more efficient than 
contracting out. Today the challenge is to explain an observed shift towards outsourcing.  
In this section, we review the recent literature on outsourcing from economics, 
management sciences, industrial relations, and sociology. Overall, we find that most scholars 
agree that domestic outsourcing has increased, albeit for different reasons. While some privilege 
the role of new technologies that facilitate outsourcing, others emphasize the role of heightened 
global competition or the role of deregulation of capital and labor markets that shift the balance 
of power from labor to capital. These changes have affected firms’ make-or-buy calculations. 
This literature, however, does not provide sufficient fine-grained analyses about the factors 
driving change or why the use of outsourcing varies across specific industries, occupations, or 
business functions, and it largely fails to address the implications for workers.  
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Economic and Management Perspectives 
To explain the make or buy decision, economic and management theories have focused 
primarily on the relative costs of internal versus external production. They explain recent 
changes in terms of technological advances that have reduced the relative costs of outsourcing. 
Chandler, for example, focuses on relative production costs (Chandler 1977, 1990). He 
argues that advances in transportation and communications technologies at the end of the 
nineteenth century led to the rise of a mass market and to mass production. Firms achieved 
higher productivity via “economies of throughput”—by processing a large volume of inputs 
through dedicated, high fixed-cost machinery. From this perspective, vertical integration of the 
supply chain followed because firms needed a steady supply of inputs and stable consumer 
demand. In addition, managerial expertise was critical for internal coordination of processes and 
ongoing improvements in productivity, growth, and market share (Helper and Sako 2010, 403ff).  
Mass production manufacturing was undermined in the 1980s, according to Chandler and 
others, by the rise of international competition and the availability of new production and 
management technologies. Flexible manufacturing technologies allowed factories to produce a 
greater variety of goods in small batches, enabling decentralized production in flexibly 
specialized firms (Piore and Sabel 1984). Japanese lean production, characterized by lead firms 
controlling manufacturing processes in a complex web of supplier firms (Dore 1986), achieved 
higher levels of innovation, lower time-to-market for new products, and higher quality and 
productivity than mass production models (Jaikumar 1986; MacDuffie 1995). U.S. firms tried to 
emulate lean production by increasing their use of contracting out and reconfiguring their supply 
chains. 
More broadly applicable across service as well as manufacturing industries is the 
transactions cost framework (Coase 1937), which explains the make or buy decision on the basis 
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of relative transaction costs. Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that the vertically integrated firm 
emerged in the twentieth century because hierarchies are more efficient than markets. 
Hierarchies minimize the costs of transactions between buyers and sellers because we live in a 
world of bounded rationality (limited ability to process information), asset specificity 
(nonstandard, idiosyncratic capital goods or skills that are especially valuable in the 
relationship), and individual opportunism (self-interested behavior with guile). Consequently, by 
retaining production in-house, firms minimize transaction costs and have more mechanisms to 
control or limit opportunism.  
In this framework, supply-side changes that reduce the cost of market transactions 
relative to internal hierarchies explain the recent vertical disintegration of firms. New 
information and communications technologies (ICT) have facilitated outsourcing and the 
decentralization of producing goods and services because ICT lowers the costs of information 
processing and coordination of work across organizational boundaries, thereby reducing the cost 
advantages of internal production. ICT also enhances firms’ capabilities to monitor and enforce 
contracts with external suppliers, thereby reducing the relative advantages of hierarchy. ICT 
allows firms to achieve control over productive activities—the advantages of vertical 
integration—without assuming the risks of actual ownership or the inflexibility of bureaucracy. 
Blois (1972) refers to this as “vertical quasi-integration,” and others as “virtual integration.” 
These supply-side arguments are typically combined with demand-side arguments—that 
reductions in product market regulation have heightened cost competition and increased 
incentives to outsource based on cost. These changes include not only trade liberalization in 
global markets but also deregulation since the 1970s in service industries such as airlines, 
telecommunications, transportation, banking, and health care. 
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Academic scholars, however, have not only tried to explain changes in firm behavior, 
many have actively promoted new decentralized organizational models, especially advocates of 
agency theory and core competency theory. Inspired by Milton Friedman’s (1970) argument that 
profit maximization is the sole purpose of the corporation—and reacting to the poor profitability 
of large conglomerates in the 1970s—a generation of agency theorists provided the rationale for 
breaking up large corporations and selling off or outsourcing less-profitable operations.  
Large publicly traded firms, they reasoned, suffer from principal-agent problems because 
dispersed shareholders (the principals) are not able to hold opportunistic managers (the agents) 
sufficiently accountable, allowing them to make decisions that favor their own interests at the 
expense of shareholders (Jensen 1986; Jensen and Meckling 1976). As a result, managers could 
engage in a variety of behaviors that are assumed to interfere with maximizing profits and 
shareholder value, such as building large conglomerates or negotiating better wages and working 
conditions.  
 As Weil (2014) and Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) have pointed out, these large 
companies tended to offer jobs with higher wages and employment security due to union 
contracts (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 2004), internal equity concerns (Weil 2014), or efficiency 
wage considerations that higher wages and better treatment of workers would elicit greater labor 
productivity (Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Rees 1993). In the United States, where the union-
nonunion wage gap is large, firms faced with increased competition or shareholder pressures 
have incentives to reduce costs by outsourcing work to lower-cost or nonunion providers. 
 Agency theory provides the rationale for eliminating these uses of corporate earnings, 
including the rent sharing of firm profits with workers. In this view, retained earnings should be 
returned to shareholders rather than spent on business expansion or above-market wages. Less-
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profitable operations should be sold off, with returns going to shareholders. Thus, agency theory 
provided the rationale for breaking up corporations—as exemplified by corporate raiders in the 
1980s—who bought up undervalued companies with poor stock market performance and sold off 
or closed divisions to increase shareholder value. These strategies soon became widespread. 
While agency theory provided the overarching argument for maximizing shareholder 
value, it did not translate this theory into specific business strategies. That was taken up by 
management strategists who argued that firms could achieve “competitive advantage,” and hence 
higher profitability for shareholders, by focusing on their “core competency”—that is, what they 
do best. In this view, the diversified conglomerate of the 1960s and 1970s unraveled because it 
lacked sufficient focus and the competence to effectively manage diverse productive activities. 
Firms, it is argued, should compete by pursuing a single-minded business strategy—for example, 
as a low-cost producer or by providing differentiated products (Porter 1985). Firms become “best 
in class” by focusing resources and talent on their core competencies and eliminating other lines 
of business (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Firms achieve competitive advantage by capitalizing on 
their unique resources (Penrose 1959) and investing in difficult to imitate human resource (HR) 
systems that enhance human and social capital (Barney 1991). 
The core competency argument justifies organizational restructuring at two levels: the 
business unit level and the operational or task level. At the business unit level, firms are 
admonished to sell off those businesses that are not best in class—hence, for example, hiving off 
entire product divisions or business functions. At the operational level, management scientists 
argue that firms should assess the “strategic value-added” of each task in their core business 
units and outsource lower valued-added activities as well as ancillary services, such as routine 
HR administration or customer service operations (Lepak and Snell 1999). This line of reasoning 
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justifies a specialized division of labor, with more value-added or knowledge-producing 
activities retained in-house and less-value-added activities outsourced.  
The knowledge-based view of the firm reaches similar conclusions (Kogut and Zander 
1992). Firms should keep in-house those tasks or capabilities that are complex and difficult to 
codify or that the firm already has and believes will contribute to innovation or higher economic 
value. It will outsource tasks that are easily codifiable or tasks in which other firms have already 
developed expertise. 
Again engineering and management scholars cited advances in technology and the digital 
revolution to explain why the ability to codify and standardize knowledge—and hence outsource 
it—has increased. They have elaborated the design principle of “modularity”—that is, the 
decomposition of complex systems into separable design elements. This enables firms to codify 
knowledge of a production process, identify separable parts, and standardize the interfaces. 
When done effectively, modularity reduces costs, increases the speed of innovation, and 
increases returns to specialization (Fixson 2005; Ulrich and Eppinger 1995). It also reduces the 
probability of contractor opportunism given the ability to standardize and specify product design 
features (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel 2000). While modularity has focused on goods 
production, codification of information and knowledge applies equally to business functions and 
service activities such as business process outsourcing, law, accounting, banking, and other 
customer-facing operations. Deblaere and Osborne (2010) argue that services have been broken 
into their components and optimized through automation and standardization. This, they contend, 
has created economies of scale that make external provision of inputs more efficient than internal 
production.  
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The rise of the computer industry and the digital revolution also help explain the rise of a 
new model of business organization—a horizontally specialized structure as opposed to a 
vertically integrated one. Saxenian’s (1996) research demonstrating the superior performance of 
networked firms in Silicon Valley compared to hierarchical firms in the MIT corridor is 
illustrative, as are Powell and colleagues’ (1996) study of the U.S. biotech industry and a number 
of studies of the ICT industry (Fields 2004; Fine 1998; Kraemer and Dedrick 2002). Firms in 
other industries have tried to apply this networked form to their own organizations. 
Institutional and Political Explanations 
In contrast to the economics and management literatures, other scholars have advanced 
institutional and political explanations for the demise of the vertically integrated firm. From 
these perspectives, U.S. corporations grew and prospered during most of the twentieth century 
based on a managerial business model in which experienced managers with industry-specific 
expertise were the source of on-going improvements in firm performance (Chandler 1977). 
Separation of ownership from organizational control ensured that managers could focus on long-
term productivity growth rather than short-term shareholder profits, and long organizational 
careers reduced opportunism by tying managers’ individual fortunes to firm outcomes (Lazonick 
1992).  
That model depended on banking and securities laws put in place in the New Deal, as 
well as on labor market regulation and union cooperation. Internal labor market theory argues 
that large employers established internal administrative rules and provided benefits and 
promotion opportunities to secure a loyal workforce and to ensure labor peace; unions negotiated 
seniority clauses and internal job ladders to enhance job and income security (Doeringer and 
Piore 1971; Jacoby 1985). Nonunion firms mimicked union rules (Foulkes 1980). 
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That model began to unravel in the 1960s and 1970s due to a series of institutional 
changes both inside and outside of the firm (Davis 2009). Internally, U.S. corporations 
increasingly focused on growth through mergers and acquisitions, giving rise to diversified 
conglomerates. Under this “portfolio model of the corporation,” the frequent buying and selling 
of businesses created a new norm of viewing companies as bundles of assets to be bought and 
sold (Hayes and Abernathy 1980). Decision-making power shifted from line managers with 
production expertise to chief financial officers, who bought and sold units based on their 
profitability (Fligstein 1990; Lazonick 1992; Zorn 2004).  
This concept of the firm as akin to Lego pieces that can be assembled and reassembled 
based on short-term profit goals has received growing attention. Some scholars particularly 
emphasize the deregulation of capital markets and labor markets from the 1970s on to explain 
the vertical disintegration of the firm and the growth of outsourcing (Appelbaum and Batt 2014). 
In this line of reasoning, financial market deregulation gave investors and stockholders more 
power to pressure firms to maximize shareholder value, and the lax enforcement of labor laws 
and the decline of union power freed them from prior constraints to do so.  
The shift in the relative power of capital and labor encouraged firms to maximize profits 
in part by selling off business units or outsourcing less-profitable parts of the value chain. Firms 
exited low-margin activities and retained those with high margins to increase earnings that could 
be returned to shareholders via higher dividends or stock buybacks, which increased share price 
(Lazonick 2014). CEOs would implement these strategies because their own pay was 
increasingly tied to stock market performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Stock option pay 
represented 20 percent of CEO compensation in 1980 but 50 percent in 1994 (Hall and Liebman 
1998).  
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Capital market deregulation occurred through a series of legislative changes. The power 
of institutional investors to influence corporate behavior increased with passage of the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Acts (ERISA) of 1974 and 1978, which allowed 
pension funds and insurance companies to invest in stock and high risk bonds for the first time 
(Gompers and Metrick 2001; Useem 1996; Zorn et al. 2005, p. 274). Some argue that the rise of 
institutional shareholders in the 1980s was critical in shifting the balance of power from 
corporate stakeholders (managers and workers) to shareholders (Donaldson 1994).  
Similarly, in the 1980s, relaxed enforcement of antitrust and securities laws and the 
elimination of state antitakeover laws (Jarrell 1983) gave corporate raiders greater leeway to 
engage in hostile takeovers and sell unprofitable businesses or increase outsourcing to improve 
profit margins. To hedge against hostile takeovers, corporations themselves started engaging in 
these strategies (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2001, pp. 132–134).  
Further deregulation of banking since the 1990s facilitated the growth of financial 
intermediaries such as private equity firms that engage in leveraged buyouts and activist hedge 
funds that are able to overthrow CEOs or force changes in business strategies based on 
ownership of a relatively small percent of a company’s stock. These actors often insist on the 
sell-off of assets, divestment of less-profitable establishments, and greater use of outsourcing 
(Appelbaum and Batt 2014; Brav, Jiang, and Kim 2015). 
Labor market deregulation occurred as global labor markets expanded (Freeman 2005) 
and as U.S. labor laws went unenforced. The decline in union density and power allowed firms 
to outsource work either to rid themselves of expensive and time-consuming union contracts or 
to prevent unions from organizing new units. Deunionization in manufacturing also diminished 
those unions’ resources for organizing new unions in emerging sectors within the United States.  
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Similarly, deregulation of service industries with traditionally high union density also 
contributed to de-unionization, the intensification of competition from nonunion competitors, 
and the ability of firms to shift work to contractors. Examples of this pattern have been 
documented in trucking (Belzer 1994; Milkman 2008), construction and building services 
(Milkman 2006), and call centers (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009, 458ff). Organizing 
campaigns in service industries have yielded single-digit union density in almost all cases. Union 
administrative failure (Piore 1989) and interunion conflicts have also led to the decline in union 
power. Beyond voiding or minimizing the power of unions, companies may use outsourcing to 
avoid accountability for other U.S. labor and employment laws, including wage and hour, 
prevailing wage, workers’ compensation, health and safety, pension, and antidiscrimination 
statutes (Weil 2014).  
In sum, academic theory and research points to an array of explanations for the vertical 
disintegration of firms across a wide range of industries, as well as why new forms of business 
organization based on interfirm networks are emerging and becoming institutionalized. While 
much of the research and theorizing has focused on globalization and the rise of global supply 
chains, none of the theories identified here are specific to that international process. Rather, they 
attribute outsourcing to heightened competitive pressures—whether in traded or nontraded 
goods—and to technological, organizational, regulatory, and political changes that affect how 
firms decide where to produce goods and services.  
What Explains Variation in Outsourcing?  
While there is a growing consensus that more networked forms of business organization 
have emerged, academic research offers few insights into why the prevalence and forms of 
outsourcing vary across different industries, firms, or productive activities. Below we identify a 
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few approaches that provide a starting point for thinking about how and why firms vary in their 
approaches to outsourcing. 
Two frameworks take an economic or functionalist approach, arguing that variation in 
how firms use outsourcing depends on the product market in which they compete and their 
organizational capabilities. One framework identifies three functions of outsourcing (Holmes 
1986). First, if firms operate in markets with high or uncertain demand fluctuation, they may 
outsource overflow work (capacity contracting) to meet increases in demand without investing in 
expensive equipment that may lie idle during economic downturns. Second, if the production of 
particular products requires specialized inputs, they may take advantage of contractors who have 
particular expertise or sophisticated technology (specialization subcontracting). Third, firms may 
choose, for a variety of reasons that are not clearly understood, to turn over large parts of the 
production process to an independent supplier (supplier subcontracting). Each of these strategies 
shifts risks to contractors and has the potential to both improve revenues for the firm (via higher 
quantity or quality of production) and reduce costs (due to contractor efficiency, absorption of 
risk, investments in technology, or payment of lower wages in nonunion settings). In this 
framework, variation in outsourcing depends on the particular characteristics of goods or 
services produced and differences in the competitive conditions of markets. Hypercompetitive 
and volatile markets or industries characterized by rapid innovation are more likely to use all 
three types of contracting. 
A second framework for why firms vary in their use of outsourcing is based on specific 
product characteristics (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). This framework integrates 
insights from transaction costs economics, production networks, and dynamic capabilities 
(organizational learning) to create a typology of five different types of networks—market, 
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modular (turnkey), relational, captive, and integrated. Gereffi and colleagues argue that variation 
depends on three factors: the complexity of information and knowledge to be transferred across 
firm boundaries, the extent to which this information and knowledge can be codified and 
transferred, and the capabilities of contracting firms and individuals.  
Variation also arises because industries and firms differ in the point at which they begin 
to outsource parts of production and how much they learn over time. Research on organizational 
learning and dynamic capabilities shows that firms may produce the same good with different 
production costs (Kogut and Zander 1992; Teece 1988; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997), and as 
new technologies or capabilities change, firms’ make or buy decisions can change as well 
(Langlois 1992). As suppliers learn over time, they can increase the scale and scope of what they 
do, develop greater sophistication, and take on increasingly complex processes or bundled 
services. As primary firms become more confident of the quality and reliability of their services, 
the use of suppliers is likely to become permanent or institutionalized (Saxenian 2005; Sturgeon 
2002). Gereffi and colleagues argue more generally that this learning process is likely to lead to a 
permanent shift away from hierarchical and captive forms towards relational, modular, and 
market forms. 
Other management scholars and sociologists argue that variation in supplier networks is 
shaped by the level of trust between partners. The repeated interactions of people in interfirm 
networks over time should create norms of trust that reduce the likelihood of individual 
opportunism (Powell 1990; Uzzi 1996). Higher trust leads to better performance outcomes 
(MacDuffie and Helper 2006), suggesting also that networked firms should become stable or 
institutionalized over time. The argument that trust matters in relational contracting contrasts 
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sharply with modularity arguments, in which trust is not essential (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel 
2000; Sturgeon 2002).  
The structure of governance may also help explain variation in interfirm networks and 
outcomes among contracting parties (Bair 2009). By governance we mean the set of rules and 
practices that establish the balance of power and control among the lead and contractor firms. 
This includes not only contractual obligations between the parties as set forth in legal 
agreements, but also the ways in which the various actors in the contracting network exert 
control over other participants. An analysis of who holds the power of decision-making and 
monitoring and enforcement of rules should help explain how value is created, appropriated, and 
distributed among actors in the production network. Variation in the governance structure, then, 
should also have important implications for the quality of jobs for workers, depending on where 
in the production network they are employed. 
Industrial relations scholars also emphasize the importance of relationships of power to 
explain variation in contracting—whether, for example, regulations or unions constrain 
managerial choice of business strategy. Variation in labor institutions, regulations, and union 
power shape firm strategies for achieving labor flexibility, the extent of use of contingent or 
temporary workers, and the use of outsourcing (Doellgast, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, and Benassi, 
forthcoming; Houseman and Osawa 2003). Where unions have sufficient bargaining power, they 
are able to limit outsourcing and negotiate the terms and conditions of its use (Doellgast, 
Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, and Benassi, forthcoming). Where unions have weak bargaining power, by 
contrast, firms may actually outsource more in order to rid themselves of union contractual 
requirements and costs, as in the case of Delphi Automotive Corporation, where 30,000 union 
jobs were offshored when private equity owners took control (Appelbaum and Batt 2014). Thus, 
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union presence and power provide one explanation for why firms that compete in the same 
markets may nonetheless have different approaches to the use of outsourcing.  
In sum, existing research points to several factors that have driven the overall growth in 
outsourcing, the break-up of vertically integrated firms, and the rise of new networked forms of 
production. Technological advances and management innovations have reduced the monitoring 
and coordination costs of arms-length transactions. New economic and management theories 
have promoted the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests to focus on profit 
maximization, leading firms to focus on high-value-added core activities and to sell off or 
outsource lower-value-added processes. And the growth of competitive pressures on firms has 
threatened margins and provided greater incentives to cut costs, in part via outsourcing. At the 
same time, specific research is thin regarding variation in the extent of outsourcing and the form 
it takes across industries, firms, and different productive activities. These questions are at the 
cutting edge of new research on outsourcing and will require consideration of a variety of 
economic, political, and legal factors.  
THE IMPACT OF OUTSOURCING ON THE QUALITY OF JOBS 
Empirical research on the effect of outsourcing on the quality of jobs is limited. In the 
literature reviewed in the previous section, the outcomes of interest are organizational 
performance, competitiveness, or firm survival. Clearly, however, changes in the organization of 
production at the firm level will spill over into changes in the organization of work, with 
implications for HR management and job quality (Rubery, Earnshaw, and Marchington 2005). 
Theories about why firms choose to outsource do, however, offer implicit predictions for 
what is likely to happen to the quality of jobs, including pay, benefits, and working conditions 
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such as health and safety. Most suggest that job quality will be lower in outsourced operations, 
although there is reason to expect variation as well. This section presents some working 
hypotheses about how outsourcing affects the quality of jobs and inequality, the causal 
mechanisms at work, and the scant empirical evidence on these questions. 
The economic and management literatures—including transactions costs, core 
competency, resource-based theories, and global value chain literatures—suggest that firms will 
retain in-house more complex jobs and outsource those involving lower-value-added tasks with 
routine to mid-range skill requirements. Tasks that are complex and require firm-specific skills 
will be retained in-house, in this view, because of the challenge of monitoring and enforcing 
contracts. The more granular arguments in the modularity literature clarify that these tasks are 
not amenable to codification and standardization, and hence not easily outsourced without 
sacrificing cost and quality. The resource-based view argues that higher-value-added tasks 
associated with core competencies must be retained in-house to preserve the firm’s source of 
competitive advantage, and the knowledge-based view argues that these unique resources are the 
firm’s lifeline to innovation and sustainability. 
In these scenarios, outsourcing changes the rules for determining wages for low-skilled 
workers, from internal administrative rules in large firms to market-based pricing across firms. 
Internal equity norms or efficiency wage considerations lead large primary firms to compress the 
wage structure. When low-skilled tasks are outsourced, internal equity norms are broken and 
workers in those jobs receive pay that more closely reflects the market wage for the specific 
tasks they do. Workers are sorted into higher-paying jobs in primary firms and lower-paying jobs 
in contractor firms according to differences in skill levels. Contractors supplying low-valued-
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added or routine services also face tougher competitive conditions as barriers to entry are low 
and price-based competitive bidding is common. 
Recent empirical studies provide some evidence that this process of outsourcing lower-
skilled jobs results in substantial pay and benefit penalties in janitorial and guard services (Dube 
and Kaplan 2010). Similarly, in their study of logistics, cleaning, security, and food services 
functions using German administrative data, Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) document the 
dramatic rise in outsourcing of these functions and the substantial decline in wages relative to 
similar jobs that were not outsourced, contributing to the rise in German wage inequality since 
the 1980s. These studies attribute the lower wages for contractors to the loss of firm-specific 
rents and to primary firm strategies to lower labor costs. 
Batt and colleagues examine the impact of outsourcing on call center jobs based on 
establishment-level survey research (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009). Regression analyses 
show systematic differences between union, nonunion in-house, and outsourced operations, with 
the latter scoring the lowest on virtually all dimensions of job quality, including substantially 
lower pay, benefits, and discretion at work; they also show greater use of electronic monitoring 
and part-time and contingent work (Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon 2006; Batt and Nohara 2009). 
Doellgast and colleagues (forthcoming) find similar wage penalties in studies of call center 
outsourcing in Europe. 
Weil (2014) argues that the quality of jobs and wages are likely to be worse in outsourced 
operations because small contractors are more likely to violate labor and employment laws. 
Typically they are less knowledgeable about what the law requires, have unsophisticated (or no) 
human resources function, and have greater incentives to violate the law because their profit 
margins are thinner. Small firms may also bargain contracts with lead firms that set unrealistic 
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performance requirements. Ji and Weil (2015), for example, find that noncompliance with 
minimum wage and overtime regulations are much higher in franchisee than in company-
operated outlets and attribute this to differences in the profit models of the two entities. Whereas 
franchisors earn their money through a royalty fee based on revenue volume, franchisees depend 
on profit margins and have greater incentives to squeeze labor costs.  
Available evidence indicates that contracting out also is associated with a higher 
incidence of workplace injuries. For example, U.S. research has found much higher injury rates 
among contract workers in petroleum (Rebitzer 1995), mining (Muzaffar et al. 2013), and among 
staffing agency workers in a variety of occupations (Foley et al. 2014; Morris 1999; Smith et al. 
2010). Particularly in triangulated employment relationships, responsibility for safety training 
may be unclear and fall through the cracks. In addition, employers with unsafe workplaces may 
turn to independent contractors or contract companies for staffing in order to shed legal liabilities 
and high workers’ compensation insurance costs, which are experience rated.4  
Finally, reputational effects, even for large contractors, may be less important for 
franchisees or subcontractors than for primary firms that compete on their brand. And the lax 
enforcement of labor and employment laws in the 2000s created a permissive context for 
contractors to evade or violate labor regulation (Bernhardt et al. 2008; Bernhardt, McGrath, and 
DeFilippis 2007).  
The question of whether these arguments also apply to outsourcing of higher skilled or 
“core” workers has not been tested. Weil argues that the downward pressures on wages and 
working conditions in outsourced operations should apply more generally, based on the 
assumption that the lead firm has asymmetric power relative to suppliers or contractors. This 
                                                 
4 See Boden, Spieler, and Wagner (2016) for an expanded discussion of the issues and empirical evidence 
on contracting out and workplace health and safety.  
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allows the lead firm to set the terms and conditions in contractual agreements and create a highly 
competitive bidding process that puts downward pressure on profit margins and, in turn, wages 
(Weil 2014, pp. 15, 100). Compared to primary firms, small contractor firms also face higher 
costs of capital and have less control over contract duration or renewal; this contractual 
uncertainty may translate into greater job insecurity for workers and greater use of contingent 
labor by contractor firms. These arguments, it should be noted, do not take into account cases 
where contractor firms may be in a strong bargaining position due to their large size and the 
range of services they provide or because they supply specialized expertise or technology.  
Where large lead firms dictate terms and conditions to smaller contractor firms, domestic 
outsourcing can lead to greater inequality in two ways. First, if it sorts higher-skilled and lower-
skilled workers into (large) primary and (small) contractor firms, then inequality between 
different skill or occupational groups is accentuated because lower-skilled workers are removed 
from the internal wage structures of large firms. The resource-based view of the firm hints that 
inequality between in-house and outsourced jobs may be even greater than one would expect 
based on core competency and human capital arguments alone. In effect, the “human resources” 
retained in-house are quasi-fixed or valuable assets that require on-going investment. Core 
workers in primary firms benefit not only from higher pay but also training and participation in 
“high involvement work systems” that offer more opportunity (Appelbaum et al. 2000). By 
contrast, routine labor in outsourced firms will be viewed as a variable cost to be minimized and 
is unlikely to receive training investments. If outsourcing distributes workers with the same skills 
and abilities into primary (large) and contractor (small) firms, then it is also likely to increase 
within-group inequality by removing workers from internal labor markets in large firms 
(Bernhardt, Dresser, and Hatton 2003; Cappelli 1999). 
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Findings from several recent studies suggest a general relationship between increased 
domestic outsourcing and rising inequality, but do not provide enough detail to sort out the 
causal mechanisms. Davis and Cobb (2010) find that inequality is inversely related to the 
proportion of workers in the largest firms. A recent study using the Longitudinal Business 
Dynamics data base and the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data (LEHD) finds that much of 
the growth in earnings inequality in the United States since the 1970s is accounted for by 
increased dispersion in earnings across establishments (Barth et al. 2014). Similarly, Handwerker 
and Spletzer (2015) and Handwerker (2015) use data from the Occupational Employment 
Statistics program to show that growth in the occupational concentration of workers in 
establishments accounts for a large share of the growth in wage inequality.  
In sum, these literatures provide economic, strategic, and political explanations for the 
existence of lower-quality jobs in outsourced operations as well as for increased inequality. 
Existing empirical findings are consistent with this argument for low-wage workers, but only a 
small number of empirical studies have been carried out, and much more research is needed. 
Variation in Outsourcing and the Quality of Jobs 
Other lines of research question the association between outsourcing and low job quality. 
The literature on “strategic” or managerial choice has demonstrated that firms may compete 
successfully in the same market on the basis of radically different business and production 
strategies (Berger 2005; Cappelli 1999). Typologies of different types of contracting relations 
(Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005) suggest that the labor conditions that result from each 
approach may be different. And a recent paper (Lakhani, Kuruvilla, and Avgar 2013) presents a 
straightforward linear mapping between contractor types and employment systems, with a 
market-based model (relying largely on contracting out) offering the lowest levels of skills and 
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job stability and the hierarchical model (with internal labor markets) offering the highest. No 
empirical tests of this framework exist, although case studies of U.S. multinational firms show 
that closer and longer-term relations with offshore suppliers tend to produce fewer labor 
violations (Locke 2013; Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007). These types of studies are suggestive, but 
they provide little guidance regarding the impact of outsourcing in the United States on the 
quality of jobs and inequality. 
The literature on trust and collaboration in supply chains similarly carries an implicit 
prediction that variation in contracting relations along these dimensions should lead to variation 
in employment systems. Some research has shown that trust and collaboration are key to 
sustainability and high performance in supply chains (Dyer and Chu 2000; MacDuffie 2011); 
and arguably, greater stability among contractors may well benefit workers via enhanced 
employee training, autonomy, and employment stability. But no empirical research has tackled 
this question.  
Research on organizational learning or dynamic capabilities also suggests that working 
conditions will vary in contractor firms, in this case based on their experience and development 
over time. As suppliers grow and become more sophisticated, the organizational capabilities in 
the supply chain can be redistributed Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005; Jacobides 2005; 
Jacobides and Winter 2005). As contractors take on more high-value-added tasks, the human 
capital requirements of jobs should increase and, in turn, lead to higher pay for workers. But 
again, these ideas are untested. 
The specific terms of contractual agreements also matter. Lead firms set forth explicit and 
detailed specifications in legal agreements with their contractors, and these requirements and the 
incentive structures they create vary substantially across different types of contract or franchising 
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agreements (Weil 2014, pp. 63–79). Any theory of the impact of domestic contracting on the 
quality of jobs should examine the terms and conditions of vendor contracts; the relative 
asymmetry between the primary and contractor firms; the mechanisms for monitoring, 
enforcement, renewal, or termination of contracts; the duration and certainty of contract renewal; 
and the business model of contractors.  
Finally, some studies show that the jobs and conditions for managerial and professional 
employees may improve when they move to specialized contractors. Dieticians and food service 
managers, for example, generally have better job promotion opportunities if they work for a 
contract food service company than if they are the direct-hire employee of an individual hospital, 
school, or other establishment with a cafeteria (Erickcek, Houseman, and Kalleberg 2003). By 
contrast, research on the unbundling of corporate functions (law, accounting, HR functions, 
shared services) provides no clear evidence regarding the quality of jobs in outsourced high-
skilled occupations (Sako, Chondrakis, and Vaaler 2013). Where access to specialized services is 
the driving force in interfirm contracting, human capital theory suggests that pay and working 
conditions should depend on the degree of specialization in each node of the network.  
In sum, the preponderance of theory predicts that workers in outsourced operations will 
experience lower wages and job quality, and a handful of empirical studies support this claim, 
but only for low-wage workers. But the causal mechanisms remain unclear or unspecified. More 
broadly, there is a clear need for systematic empirical research that identifies a wider range of 
outsourcing models and documents the relationship between the type of outsourcing and the 
quality of jobs and inequality, specifies the causal mechanisms in this relationship, and identifies 
the institutional conditions under which these relationships hold. 
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THE STATE OF DATA ON THE PREVALENCE OF AND GROWTH IN DOMESTIC 
OUTSOURCING 
Most available data point to significant growth in domestic outsourcing in recent years. 
Nevertheless, there are substantial gaps and, likely, biases in these data. In this section, we 
review available evidence of the prevalence of and growth in domestic outsourcing, discuss the 
limitations of existing data, and argue for the urgent need for better information. 
Evidence on Prevalence and Growth  
Evidence from government establishment data 
One way to get a sense of the scope of the growth in domestic contracting out is to 
examine employment growth in industries that primarily contract services to businesses. The 
relative employment growth of professional and business services is especially notable because 
other businesses are the principal consumers of these services, and consequently employment 
trends in this sector are often used as a key indicator of outsourcing growth.5 The share of payroll 
employment in professional and business services has nearly doubled from 7.3 to 13.9 percent 
since 1970. Within professional and business services, about half of the growth was accounted 
for by industries primarily employing workers in professional occupations (e.g., computer 
systems and management and technical consulting) and about half in industries primarily 
employing workers in nonprofessional occupations (e.g., security services, services to buildings 
and dwellings, and temporary help and other staffing services). 
While employment growth in professional and business services provides a useful 
indicator of the growth of domestic outsourcing in the United States, it is crude. Consumers 
account for some of the higher demand for professional and business services, such as legal 
                                                 
5 Data on payroll employment come from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program, a monthly 
establishment survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
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services. Moreover, contract workers are employed in all sectors, and consequently a focus only 
on the professional and business services sector will miss important developments occurring in 
other segments of the economy.6  
Input-output data developed by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), in 
contrast, provide a natural tool to comprehensively examine growth in domestic outsourcing. 
Input-output (I-O) tables show the dollar value of the intermediate inputs one industry uses from 
itself and from others, and any increase in outsourcing should appear as an increase in the use of 
intermediate inputs by the outsourcing industry.7 By linking the industry providing the contract 
services with the user industry, input-output data show not only trends in outsourcing but also 
variations across industries in outsourcing patterns.8 In addition, I-O data, in combination with 
employment data in the contract industry, permit estimation of the number of workers affected 
by outsourcing.  
Several studies have relied on I-O data to document the growth of domestic outsourcing 
in the United States. Using data on the input-output structure of the economy, Yuskavage, 
Strassner, and Medeiros (2008) report that the share of GDP accounted for by domestic providers 
of outsourcing services—which they defined as purchased services excluding 
telecommunications and financial services—rose from 7 percent to 12 percent between 1982 and 
2006. Similarly, Berlingieri (2014) uses input-output data for the U.S. economy to examine the 
                                                 
6 For example, food services contractors and airport and airline contractors are not classified in the 
professional and business services sector, but instead are identified with their own codes under food services and 
support activities for transportation, respectively. In other cases, contractors are not identified by distinct codes and 
are grouped with other establishments in a given industry (e.g., in mining and telecommunications, see Weil [2014]). 
In these cases, subcontracting will show up as own-industry inputs in the I-O data – i.e., inputs purchased by firms 
classified in the same industry. The increased share of employment in professional and business services also could 
reflect other compositional changes, such as an increase in the relative size of industries that outsource, and do not 
solely reflect changing staffing practices within industries. 
7 Dollar values in the annual I-O tables may be deflated by the appropriate price indexes to yield real 
growth in outsourcing.  
8 I-O data can show differences in outsourcing across industries but not across firms within industries. In 
the next section we propose industry studies that, among other things, will help us understand variation in 
outsourcing practices among firms.  
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extent to which the shift in U.S. employment from manufacturing to services is the result of 
outsourcing. Controlling for changes over time in demand for manufactured products and 
services, he concludes that a substantial share of the increase in services employment and the 
decline in manufacturing employment is the consequence of outsourcing. Services previously 
housed in manufacturing firms have been outsourced to service firms, highlighting the 
importance of outsourcing to professional and business services as noted above. Other evidence 
supports this conclusion. Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2012) estimate that by 2006, staffing 
services (primarily temporary agencies) added close to 10 percent to employment in 
manufacturing establishments, compared to just 2 percent in 1989. Currently about half of the 
workers needed for the production of manufactured goods are employed outside the 
manufacturing sector (Houseman 2014; Timmer, Los, and de Vries 2015).  
Evidence from government household surveys 
While statistics on industry employment and input-output tables are derived from 
business surveys, government household surveys provide some additional evidence of the 
magnitude of the contract workforce. Most notably, the Supplement on Contingent and 
Alternative Work Arrangements (CWS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS), which was 
conducted five times between 1995 and 2005, asks individuals about their status as temporary 
help workers, independent contractors (including independent contractors and freelance 
workers), or contract company workers. With respect to the last category, the survey focuses 
only on individuals who work for a company that primarily contracts their services to one 
organization and who work at that client’s worksite. This is a subset of contract company 
workers, many of whom work off-site or at multiple client sites. One valuable feature of the 
CWS is that it surveyed contract and temporary agency workers on the industry of the client 
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firm, and so constitutes the only source in federal statistics on where these types of workers 
perform services. 
In the 2005 survey, 7.4 percent of workers identified themselves as independent 
contractors, independent consultants, or freelance workers. Another 0.9 percent and 0.6 percent 
indicated that they worked, respectively, for temporary help agencies and other companies that 
contracted out their services to one client (BLS 2005). The estimated share of the workforce in 
temporary help agencies from the CWS, however, is roughly half the estimated share as 
measured from the BLS establishment, which, as we discuss below, raises questions about the 
accuracy of estimates from the CWS.  
In 2015, the Rand American Life Panel Survey included many of the same questions 
asked on the CWS (last conducted in 2005), along with questions on workers’ use of online 
platforms (Krueger 2016). This new survey evidence suggests significant growth over the last 
decade in various types of nonstandard employment arrangements, particularly in on-site 
contract workers. The share of respondents identifying themselves as contract workers who work 
at the client’s worksite jumped by more than fivefold from 0.6 percent in the 2005 CWS to 3.1 
percent in the 2015 American Life Panel Survey.9 The share participating in on-line “gig” work 
is small, accounting for only 0.5 percent of employment, according to the survey estimates.  
Evidence from employer surveys, industry research, and case studies  
Drawing on a combination of government data, private surveys, and other proprietary 
sources of information, researchers and analysts have been able to generate industry- or function-
specific estimates of the prevalence of (and sometimes trends in) domestic outsourcing. In 
addition, case studies have provided detailed descriptions of the evolution of supply chains. 
                                                 
9 Although the survey results are intended to be comparable to those from the CWS, the American Life 
Panel’s use of an online survey format and possibly other methodological differences could account for some of the 
apparent growth in contract and other nonstandard employment arrangements.  
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Academic researchers have conducted a number of employer surveys that, dating back to 
the late 1980s, have pointed to the high incidence of and growth in domestic outsourcing (e.g., 
Abraham 1990; Houseman 2001; Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden 2003; Nielson and Sturgeon 
2014). For example, using information from the 2010 National Organizations Survey, which 
included questions on private sector business use of contractors for various functions, Nielsen 
and Sturgeon (2014) summarize the percent of businesses using domestic contractors for 
facilities management (34 percent), IT systems (34 percent), transportation services (30 percent), 
sales and marketing (22 percent), R&D (20 percent), management, administration and back-
office functions (14 percent), and customer service (12 percent). A 2003 establishment-level 
survey of U.S. call centers estimated that almost 15 percent of centers at the time were 
outsourced operations, but because they were larger in size they employed almost 50 percent of 
call center workers (Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon 2006, p. 336; Batt calculations of original data). 
Information routinely collected by consulting firms and industry trade groups on 
outsourcing offers provides another source of nongovernmental data. Multiple surveys conducted 
by national consulting firms have found that a majority of firms contract out at least some of 
their HR functions, including payroll and benefits administration, background checks, training, 
and recruitment (Greer, Youngblood, and Gray 1999). IT services constitute an important share 
of services outsourcing, including data centers, help desk services, and training (Sharpe 2001). 
Industry-specific surveys show substantial rates of contracting out for a wide range of functions 
across many industries. One summary of proprietary data on insurance companies found high 
rates of contracting out for a diverse set of services (Greenwald 1999). Almost 90 percent of 
survey respondents reported that at least some use contractors for employee benefits 
administration. For other services, the comparable figures were 85 percent for legal services, 81 
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percent for cafeteria services, 77 percent for janitorial and housekeeping, 61 percent for security, 
58 percent for payroll processing, and 47 percent for loss control. Similar surveys exist for air 
transportation, banking, communications, construction, health care, hospitality, manufacturing, 
mining, pharmaceuticals, and retail, among others (Bernhardt and Garrick 2013). Although the 
quality and representativeness of specific data from consulting firms and industry trade groups 
are often hard to assess, the evidence from these sources consistently points to a high incidence 
of contracting out of many business functions. 
Researchers have also conducted industry case studies that yield detailed descriptions of 
the evolution of supply chains. The critically important logistics sector is a case in point. 
Deregulation of freight transportation in the 1980s, developments in information technology in 
the 1990s, and growth of complex global supply chains have resulted in significant growth of 
outsourcing in logistics (Bonacich and Wilson 2008). Examples include the shift to independent 
contractor drivers in trucking and the growth of delivery services such as FedEx based on that 
model; the contracting out of warehouses; and the rise of third-party logistics (3PL) companies to 
which businesses outsource the management, transportation, and storage of goods and 
information in their supply chains. Studies have described the dramatic rise during the 1990s and 
2000s in U.S. manufacturers’ outsourcing of transportation and warehousing, once core functions 
of manufacturing firms (Armbruster 2003; Baker and Hubbard 2003; Belzer 2002; Lieb and 
Bentz 2005). Use of 3PLs is common in all sectors, however, including retail, hospitality, food 
and beverage, construction, and energy (Langley and Capgemini Consulting 2015). Large 
companies commonly use multiple 3PLs and hire a firm to manage its outsourced logistics 
functions (so-called fourth-party logistics companies, or 4PLs). Recent survey evidence suggests 
that logistics outsourcing accounts for about half of business spending on transportation and 
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close to 40 percent of spending on warehouse activities (Leuschner et al. 2014). Third- and 
fourth-party logistics companies are classified in various industries, including warehousing, 
transportation, and wholesale trade, making it difficult to observe trends in logistics contracting 
from published government statistics.10  
Data Limitations  
While case studies have provided important insights into the growth of contracting out in 
various sectors, the information is inherently fragmented and of varying quality. In theory, 
surveys conducted by the U.S. statistical agencies should provide more systematic time-series 
data for understanding the extent of outsourcing, its growth, and implications for workers and 
public policy. But official statistics have substantial limitations.  
BEA input-output data are useful for showing broad trends in domestic outsourcing in the 
national economy and for identifying which industries that provide intermediate goods and 
services are expanding. They are less useful, however, for identifying the user industries of 
specific intermediates because the data on which the I-O tables depend are often dated and suffer 
from significant gaps. Although annual industry surveys conducted by the census are used to 
update the I-O tables, the most detailed information for estimating the I-O structure of the 
economy comes from the Economic Census, conducted every five years. BEA uses information 
from the Economic Census and other sources to revise the I-O tables (and other national 
accounts), and it typically takes 5 or more years to integrate the latest Economic Census data into 
the accounts. Thus, at any point in time, much of the information used to estimate the I-O 
structure of the economy is 5 to 10 years old. 
                                                 
10 Other research has documented the growth in outsourcing of janitorial and security functions (Dube and 
Kaplan 2010), food services (Lane et al. 2003), and call centers (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009; Batt, Doellgast, 
and Kwon 2006).  
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More important, while the Economic Census collects detailed information on material 
input purchases, information in the Economic Census and annual census surveys on purchased 
services is generally collected for highly aggregated categories. For example, census surveys ask 
companies to report expenditures on all professional and technical services. In addition, the data 
reported combine expenditures on domestic and imported goods and services.11 In sum, 
published estimates of industry input use are often derived from limited information, and 
researchers should use them with caution.12  
Workers in contract arrangements are employees of the company contracting their 
services or are self-employed as independent contractors. Household and establishment surveys 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) do not systematically provide information on 
the characteristics of workers in various contract arrangements or the organizations using the 
contract services (see Bernhardt 2014). The CWS was designed to help fill this information gap. 
Concerns have been raised, however, about the ability of individuals (or family members 
answering on their behalf) to properly identify themselves as employed in a contingent or 
alternative work arrangement. As noted, the share of workers reporting themselves as employed 
by temporary help agencies in the CWS is considerably lower than the share derived from the 
establishment survey (CES), fueling concerns about the quality of data on workers in alternative 
arrangements. The most recent CWS survey was conducted in 2005, and budget problems stalled 
efforts to replicate it. The 2016 announcement that it will be conducted again in May 2017 is a 
welcome development. The narrow coverage of contract workers and concerns about data quality 
                                                 
11 To estimate imported and domestic intermediate goods and services separately, BEA makes the 
assumption that each industry uses imported inputs in proportion to its overall use of the input in the economy.  
12 In recent years, the Census Bureau has collected information on companies’ expenditures on temporary help and 
professional employer organizations and has added questions to various surveys about whether companies use or 
provide contract manufacturing services. While the collection of such detailed data is currently piecemeal, it 
represents an important step toward improving data on outsourcing and will provide a more complete picture of the 
incidence across industries of certain types of contract arrangements.  
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in earlier rounds of the CWS have limited its usefulness for understanding the scope of domestic 
contracting out and its implications for workers. Researchers have begun providing input to BLS 
and the Census Bureau that may improve the usefulness of the new data to be collected in 2017 
and that may involve supplementing information collected in the CWS with new information 
from establishment surveys.  
In sum, available information points to rapid growth in domestic outsourcing in a wide 
range of industries since the 1980s. Yet, data gaps limit our ability to understand the magnitude 
of the phenomenon and its impact on job quality, and to fashion appropriate policy responses. In 
the next section we lay out a major initiative on domestic outsourcing, detailing the questions it 
should answer and providing a menu of research methodologies and potential data sources.  
A PROPOSED RESEARCH AGENDA AND RESEARCH NETWORK ON  
DOMESTIC OUTSOURCING 
In what follows, we propose a comprehensive agenda to deepen our understanding of 
domestic outsourcing and the development of a network of researchers to study this important 
phenomenon. We first lay out three central questions to advance our knowledge of how and why 
domestic contracting has expanded and its effects on jobs, wages, and inequality. Then we 
propose that research proceed on two parallel tracks that will inform one another. One track is to 
conduct in-depth industry studies; the second is to develop systematic measures of domestic 
outsourcing in government data, which will be necessary to understand the scope and 
implications of domestic contracting economy-wide.  
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Research Questions 
We suggest that three broad questions should drive future research on domestic outsourcing. 
While no single study will be able to address all of these questions, they provide a conceptual 
roadmap for the knowledge base that needs to be created.  
1)  How common is domestic outsourcing, has it grown over time, and how many workers are 
affected?  
a)  At the firm (or establishment) level, what is the prevalence of outsourcing, and has it 
grown over time? Possible measures include percent of firms that contract for particular 
functions, and firms’ purchases of goods and services from other firms (or independent 
contractors) as a share of economic output.  
b)  How many workers are employed by contractors, has that number grown over time, and 
do the workers differ in demographics from their in-house counterparts?  
c)  In which industries are contract workers employed? How have jobs been reallocated 
across sectors over time as a result of domestic outsourcing? 
 
2)  What are the drivers of domestic outsourcing in particular industries or production networks, 
and what are the different forms it takes?  
a)  What are the economic, political, and public policy forces that have shaped the prevalence 
of domestic outsourcing over time, and which functions are contracted out? Of particular 
interest is the impact of financialization as well as institutional factors (e.g., labor market and 
product market regulation, unions and social movements, consumer demands, and political 
pressures). 
b)  What is the role of technology in facilitating domestic outsourcing and the forms it takes? 
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c)  Do contracting strategies vary by industry segment, ownership structure, business 
strategy, or other organizational characteristics? What explains variation in firms’ contracting 
decisions within and across particular industries or product networks? 
d)  What are the important characteristics and types of firm-to-firm contracting relationships? 
In particular, how is bargaining power distributed, and which actors in a production network 
are setting the economic terms of contracts? How are contractor industries changing over 
time, in terms of the degree of consolidation or competitiveness?  
e)  Where relevant, what is the relationship between international outsourcing strategies and 
domestic outsourcing strategies? What determines the mix of the two strategies, and do they 
influence one another? 
3)  What is the effect of domestic outsourcing on job quality and the employment relationship? 
a)  Job quality measures include wages, benefits, hours, workload, job stability, schedule 
stability, occupational safety and health, incidence of wage theft, and access to training and 
promotions.  
b)  The employment relationship refers to the worker’s status under employment and labor 
laws (e.g., whether the worker is covered by those laws, who the employer of record is, 
whether the job is permanent or temporary).  
c)  What is the effect of domestic outsourcing on unionization and other sources of worker 
leverage in the labor market? 
d)  Does the impact of outsourcing on jobs and workers differ, and if so, what are the sources 
of that variation? In particular, what is the role of specialized skills or skill requirements of 
jobs?  
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Industry Studies 
Few nationally representative datasets contain the types of measures and the detail 
needed to capture the outsourcing phenomenon and its effect on job quality. Aggregate data also 
does not lend itself to explaining the causal mechanisms linking changes in the organization of 
production to changes in the quality of jobs. Moreover, the characteristics of contracting (such as 
factors driving its use, its structure, and impacts on workers) vary substantially by industry and 
business function. A broad undertaking of industry and firm-based research that engages a cohort 
of researchers from diverse disciplines is needed to identify the factors that govern interfirm 
contractual relationships, including the important role of the lead firm’s business strategy, the 
relative bargaining power of lead and contractor firms, and the effects of variation in these 
factors on wages and working conditions. In addition, because businesses increasingly rely on 
contracting and supply chain management, trade associations and marketing and consulting firms 
have become important players and may be the source of proprietary data on a range of 
important industry trends. As a result, our assessment is that better data are often available at the 
industry level.  
We therefore propose the type of multi-method research design that is frequently used in 
industry studies, combining analysis of (a) government data, including micro data from 
government household and business surveys or administrative data (e.g., state Unemployment 
Insurance wage records data available through Census Data Research Centers); (b) proprietary or 
novel datasets from industry trade groups or marketing/consulting firms; (c) structured case 
studies13 of a number of firms and contractors, ideally chosen to understand different types of 
contracting relationships; (d) interviews with industry experts, including unions where present, 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the controlled case study design used by some researchers in Appelbaum, Bernhardt, 
and Murnane (2003). 
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and analysis of industry trade press and management publications; and (e) new data collection 
where feasible. The exact mix of these components will vary across studies.  
Given the variation in contracting relationships across different industry contexts, 
researchers may decide to focus their studies in one of several ways: 
 Contracting industries as the unit of analysis, such as financial services, retail, or hospitality.  
 Contractor industries as the unit of analysis, such as professional and business services, 
including information technology services, third-party logistics companies, and online 
staffing platforms.  
 Production networks as the unit of analysis, such as the health care sector, the logistics 
sector, or the food supply chain. 
 Business functions as the unit of analysis (see Nielsen and Sturgeon [2014] for a well-
developed categorization). 
Examples of each of these approaches are found in the empirical studies we have cited in 
this paper. The contracting industry approach is illustrated in Weil (2014) and Ji and Weil (2015) 
on the hotel and other service industries. In this research, the authors combine extensive field 
research with proprietary data and government administrative data to capture the relationship 
between complex outsourcing structures, the quality of jobs, and labor law and safety and health 
violations. The contractor industry approach is represented in the extensive research on the 
temporary services industry, where the growth of the industry and its implications for workers 
compensation, job stability, and long-term employment and earnings trajectories were captured 
by combining government survey data (the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data and 
Occupational Employment Statistics), government administrative data, proprietary company 
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data, and evidence from case studies and structured interviews.14 Studies of the logistics industry 
draw on the production network approach; for example, Bonacich and Wilson (2008) combine 
industry data, interviews with industry experts, managers and workers, and archival research to 
map out and analyze the impact of the logistics revolution in the United States, using southern 
California ports as their entry point. Finally, call center research has used the business function 
as the unit of analysis (Batt, Holman, and Holtgrewe 2009; Batt and Nohara 2009; Batt, 
Doellgast, and Kwon 2006). Given the lack of national data on business functions, that research 
combined extensive field work in companies with a nationally representative random survey of 
in-house and outsourced call centers whose frame drew on a database of 60,000 call center 
subscribers to a trade journal. Results showed systematic differences in the wages, benefits, job 
security, union coverage, and other job attributes of in-house and outsourced call center jobs. 
Even at the level of a specific industry, developing a research design to document and 
analyze domestic outsourcing is conceptually difficult. One approach, developed by Gary Gereffi 
to analyze commodity chains, identifies four analytical dimensions to consider: an input-output 
structure, a geographical configuration, a governance structure, and an institutional context (see 
Bair 2009). This approach may be useful because it highlights the importance of integrating an 
analysis of changes in the economic structure as well power relations that shape the distribution 
of outcomes among different firms and groups of workers. 
Analyzing Changes Over Time in Domestic Outsourcing 
In examining changes in outsourcing over time, it is also important to consider a number 
of different scenarios (see Berlingieri 2014). Contracting firms may outsource a function that 
                                                 
14 Studies include Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2005); Autor and Houseman (2006, 2010); Benner, Leete, 
and Pastor (2007); Hamersma, Heinrich, and Mueser (2014); Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2005, 2009); Houseman 
(2001); Houseman and Heinrich (2015); Kalleberg, Reynolds, and Marsden (2003); and Lane et al. (2003). 
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was previously performed in-house—either eliminating the in-house function or continuing to 
perform it while adding capacity via contractors. Firms may also contract for new functions that 
were never performed in-house in order to access new skills and technologies—and again, they 
may either eliminate outdated in-house functions or continue to perform them while adding new 
capacity via contractors. These changes in contracting can differ substantially in their impact on 
the distribution of jobs across firms and on wages and job quality.  
Note also that firms’ contracting decisions may change over time, with some functions 
being outsourced only to be brought back in-house later, as the circumstances specific to a firm 
change. More generally, in any industry at any point in time, some firms will outsource certain 
functions as others bring the same functions back in-house. In analyzing the effect of outsourcing 
over time in an industry or network, it will be important to identify the net changes that 
constitute trends, along with the drivers behind those trends and their implications for wages and 
working conditions.  
In addition, important effects on wages and working conditions may originate from the 
contractor firms themselves. Contractor industries may consolidate or fragment; new business 
models and product markets may emerge; and regulatory or broader institutional contexts may 
change. Even if the prevalence of domestic outsourcing does not change, such shifts on the 
contractor side of the equation may have important implications for jobs and workers. 
Candidates for study 
In selecting industries or production networks for study, researchers should have some a 
priori evidence that a) the level of domestic outsourcing has significantly increased or the nature 
of interfirm contracting relationships has changed, and b) these changes have potentially 
important implications for compensation and other aspects of job quality. Based on our review of 
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the existing literature, some examples of important sectors for researchers to study include, but 
are not limited to, the following:  
 Health care: hospitals, outpatient facilities, nursing homes, home health care15 
 Logistics: transportation, warehousing, wholesale 
 Professional and business services 
 Computer and information technology 
 Retail, restaurants, hotels, arts and entertainment 
 Food supply chain 
 Energy and utilities 
 Finance, insurance, and real estate 
 Pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and other bio-tech companies 
 On-demand platforms: Uber, Upwork, TaskRabbit, etc. 
 Public sector: federal, state, local 
Beyond the choice of industry, we encourage researchers to focus on a range of 
occupations—from less-skilled to intermediate and higher-skilled groups. All are affected by the 
reorganization of production, and an important research task is to determine whether 
restructuring has similar or differential effects on distinct groups in the occupational hierarchy, 
potentially leading to greater or less inequality.  
Economy-Wide Research and Data Development 
The industry studies proposed above would largely exploit available data from 
government surveys and proprietary sources, combined with interview evidence, to shed light on 
the causes and consequences of outsourcing in key industries. In addition, despite its weaknesses, 
                                                 
15 A detailed discussion of health care restructuring as an illustrative example is available from the authors. 
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valuable insights may still be gained from using economy-wide data to arrive at benchmark 
prevalence estimates. For example, to our knowledge, no recent analysis has comprehensively 
examined patterns of growth in domestic outsourcing and the number and types of workers 
affected using input-output data and industry employment matrixes for the U.S. economy.16 
Similarly, tax data could be better leveraged to help resolve debates about the size of the 
independent contractor workforce. 
Nevertheless, a more complete understanding of domestic outsourcing in the economy 
will require the development of new, nationally representative data sources. We encourage work 
on two fronts. The first involves making better use of existing data by enabling the linking of 
both survey and administrative micro data collected by different government agencies. Plans to 
add micro data from BLS surveys in centers that currently house only census data offer great 
promise for research on domestic outsourcing. Linking data from the Occupational Employment 
Statistics program and the National Longitudinal Survey to existing data in these centers, for 
example, would give researchers a powerful tool for studying outsourcing and should be given 
high priority. 
The second involves new data collection. Academic researchers and staff of government 
statistical agencies should join efforts to develop new measures and data sources that will allow 
precise estimates of domestic outsourcing and direct analysis of its impact on job quality. Given 
the significant budget constraints on federal agencies, the priority should be on identifying ways 
to leverage existing government surveys to gather more detailed data, add new measures, and 
expand sampling frames; private funding could help pilot such changes. Academic researchers 
                                                 
16 Clinton (1997) provides a useful example of triangulating trends in domestic contracting from 
employment, occupational, and industry output and input data. 
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could also develop and test new surveys—for example, of on-demand workers—that could serve 
as models for future government surveys.  
Information will need to be collected through a combination of household/worker-level 
surveys and establishment/firm-level surveys. Each has strengths and weaknesses, and the 
optimal respondent type will vary with the information being collected. Even basic information 
on the number of contract workers and their distribution by client industry (in addition to the 
industry of their employer) may need to be collected from multiple surveys and estimates may 
need to be modeled. Household surveys, such as the CWS, may provide the best vehicle for 
estimating the number of on-site contract workers who typically work for one client and also the 
industry of the client firm, though improvements to existing survey instruments may be desirable 
to reduce reporting error. In contrast, it is unlikely that information on off-site contracting 
relationships, which are more complex, can be reliably obtained from respondents to household 
surveys. This information will need to be collected through establishment or firm surveys, and 
the information collected in such surveys will be limited to information that businesses typically 
maintain for tax and other accounting purposes. Because businesses that outsource work do not 
systematically record information on the number of workers hired through contractors—only 
their expenditures on contract services—contract services expenditure data must be collected 
from businesses, and the number of contract workers by client industry must be modeled.17  
Finally, and equally important, rigorously studying the effects of outsourcing on job 
quality will often require the linking of data from various agencies at the federal and state level. 
This in turn will require greater cooperation among agencies and improved access for researchers 
to confidential government micro data. The planned addition of BLS data to existing census 
research data centers is a good start and should be expedited. 
                                                 
17 Similarly, contract companies cannot consistently and reliably allocate their workers by client industry.  
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Figure 1  Levels of Analysis for Understanding Domestic Outsourcing 
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Figure 2  Relationship between Contracting Out and Employment Status  
 
 In-house jobs Contracted jobs (both on-site and 
off-site) 
Standard jobs  Permanent employees   Permanent employees  
Nonstandard jobs  On-call  
 Direct-hire temporary 
 
 Independent contractors, 
including on-demand platform 
workers 
 Temp agency workers 
 Leased/professional employer 
organization workers 
 
 
 
 
 
  
64 
Figure 3  Various Contracting Patterns (modified from Barenberg [2015]) 
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Figure 4  Combination of Contractual Patterns (modified from Barenberg [2015]) 
 
 
 
 
trucking 
company 
warehouse 
temp 
staffing 
company 
furniture 
factory 
linen 
factory 
industrial 
laundry 
company 
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
 c
o
n
tr
ac
to
rs
 
hotel  
franchise 
security 
company 
hotel 
franchise 
landscaping 
company 
hotel 
company 
hotel 
franchise 
